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HUSBAND AND WIFE OR 'FAMILY" PARTNERSHIPS
MILTON ELROD, JR.*
Recent years have revealed a determined and uninter-
rupted rise in the number of commercial enterprises conduct-
ed on a partnership basis.1 Treasury Department figures
show an increase of almost 70%o over the number of partner-
ship returns five years ago, and an increase of almost 130%
over the figure ten years ago in 1934.2 It would appear that
a substantial part of this increase has resulted from the cre-
ation of partnerships between husband and wife (sometimes
between husband and wife and children) for federal income
tax reasons. The tax saving in such family partnerships is
rather obvious, being found in the fact that the profits of
the business (the main source of family income) may be
divided among the members of the family (the partners),
and taxed at considerably lower rates than would be the case
if these profits were all lumped together in the return of the
husband or father.
The reported cases involving litigation over the tax sta-
tus of these family partnerships grow in number almost daily.
The subject becomes of ever-increasing importance to the
tax lawyer, and to the general practitioner as well, as more
and more of his clients find that the use of this device for
the reduction of income tax costs has its complications. Hence,
the reason for this attempt to survey the subject, and to
draw some practical conclusions from the cases.
FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS ESSENTIALLY VALID
First of all, let us consider briefly the essential validity
of such family partnership arrangements.
In Indiana, at least, there can be no question as to the
* Of the Indiana bar.
1. See Polisher, "Family Partnerships" (June, 1944) Taxes Maga-
zine at 272.
2. The Internal Revenue Bureau "Quarterly Survey of Administra-
tive and Audit Activities" shows 490,320 partnership returns filedfrom Jan. to Dec., 1943, compared with 453,902 for the same
period of 1942; 372,796 in 1941; 290,876 in 1940; 273,61 in 1939;
214,881 in 1934.
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legality of a partnership between a husband and his wife.
That a married woman can engage in business as a partner
with her husband has been decided affirmatively in at least
two Indiana cases. 3  Nor is there anything in the Internal
Revenue Code, or the various federal Revenue Acts, which
invalidates such a family partnership for income tax pur-
poses. On the contrary, the legality and effectiveness of
such partnerships between husband and wife has been fre-
quently and repeatedly recognized by writers on tax law4 and
by the courts in many cases upholding such family partner-
ships and taxing the income and profits to the respective
partners in proportion to their respective interests in the
business.2
Notwithstanding this general acceptance of the basic
validity and propriety of partnerships between husband and
wife, both in the strictly legal sense, and in the broader eco-
nomic and practical view of the tax cases, many such part-
3. Koering v. Bowman et al., 194 Ind. 433, 14 N.E. 117 (1924);
Anderson v. Citizens National Bank 38 Ind. App. 190, 76 N. E.
811 (1906). But see conflict on power of married woman to
enter into partnership with her husband under some state statutes,
noted in 26 Am. Jur. (Husband and Wife) §247.
4 See Polisher, supra note 1; C. C. H. 1944 Fed. Tax Serv., Rewrite
Bull. No. 18; 2 Mertens, "The Law of Federal Income Taxation"§18.07.
5. Humphreys v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F. (2d) 430(C. C. A. 2nd, 1937); Millard D. Olds v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 15 B. T. A. 560 (1929), affirmed 60 F. (2d) 252(C. A. A. 6th, 1931); Alford T. Wagner v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 17 B. T. A. 1030 (1929); Arthur Stryker v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 17 B. T. A. 1033 (1929);
Richard H. Oakley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 24 B. T.
A. 1082 (1931); Charles Tift v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 25 B. T. A. 986 (1932); Elizabeth M. Coombs v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 25 B. T. A. 1320 (1932); N. H.
Hazlewood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 29 B. T. A. 595(1933) ; Jasper Sipes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 31
B. T. A. 709 (1934); Walter M. Moyer v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 35 B. T. A. 1155 (1937); Clinton Davidson v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 B. T. A. 576 (1941); Justin
Potter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A. 607(1942); Max German, 2 T. C. 474; Sidney Nathan, Memo T. C.
Opinion, May 14, 1943; E. R. Ledbetter, Memo B. T. A. opinion,
April 30, 1942 Estate of Barringer, Memo B. T. A. opinion, Sept.
16, 1942; James 0. Peterson, Memo T. C. opinion, Oct. 30, 1943;
Robert P. Scherer, 3 T. C. -, No. 100; J. D. Johnston, 3 T. C.
No. 101; Felix Zukaitis, 3 T. C. , No. 102; M. W. Smith,
3 T. C. - , No. 110; Wachovia Bank (Stanback) v. Commission-
er of Internal Revenue, Memo T. C. opinion, June 22, 1944; Irene
McCullough, Memo T. C. opinion, July 19, 1944; Armstrong v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A.
-, July 6, 1944), reversing 1 T. C. 1008 (1943); Hardymon v.
Glenn, - F. Supp. - (Ky., June 28, 1944).
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nerships have failed to accomplish the intended tax objec-
tives; and the income of what was apparently a formal fam-
ily partnership between the husband and wife, or between
husband and wife and children, has repeatedly been taxed in
full to the husband-father. In fact, the decisionE. and rulings
rejecting such partnerships for income tax purposes are
slightly more numerous than those which have upheld fam-
ily partnership arrangements.,
These cases and rulings refusing to recognize family
partnerships for income tax purposes have not questioned the
basic validity of such an arrangement in and of itself, which,
as noted, is clearly recognized. They have simply questioned
the fact of partnership in the particular cases under consid-
eration. The family partnership apparently has the same
status as any other partnership for federal income tax pur-
poses, where in fact and in truth a partnership exists. In
those cases upholding family partnerships for income tax
purposes, the courts have found on the facts that a bona
fide and actual partnership existed, and that the wife and
6. Avent v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 76 F. (2d) 386
(C. A. A. 5th, 1935); Covington v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 103 F. (2d) 201 (C. A. A. 5th, 1939); Tinkoff v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 120 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 7th,
1941); Earp v. Jones, 131 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942),
cert. den. 63 Sup. Ct. 665 (1943); Mead v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 131 F. (2d) 323 (C. C. A. 5th, 1(142), cert. den.
63 Sup. Ct. 851 (1943); Waldburger v. Helvering, 131 F. (2d) 598
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1942); Villere v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 133 F. (2d) 905 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943); Schroder v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 134 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 5th,
1943); Estate of Wickham v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
22 B. T. A. 1393 (1931), affirmed 65 F. (2d) 527 (C. C. A. 8th,
1933); Ed Kasch and Theodora Kasch v. Commi3sioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 25 B. T. A. 284 (1932), affirmed 63 F. (2d) 466
(C. C. A. 5th, 1933); Harry C. Fisher v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 29 B. T. A. 1041 (1934), affirmed 74 F. (2d) 1014
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1935); Robert S. Eaton v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 37 B. T. A. 283 (1938), affirmed 100 F. (2d) 1013
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1939); Thomas M. McIntyre v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 37 B. T. A. 812 (1938); Harold G. Parker and
May J. Parker, Husband and Wife v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 39 B. T. A. 423 (1939); Francis Doll, 2 T. C. 276;
Francis E. Tower, 3 T. C. - , No. 49; A. L. LuEthaus, 3 T. C.
-, No. 67; 0. W. Lowry, 3 T. C. -, No. 97; Fiank J. Lorenz,
3 T. C. -, No. 98; Fredeking v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, Memo T. C. opinion, Oct. 21, 1943; Edward J. Miller,
Memo T. C. opinion, March 18, 1944; R. W. C .-mfield, Memo
T. C. opinion, Feb. 9, 1944; W. P. Sewell, Memo T. C. opinion,
Feb. 7, 1944; Blalock v. Allen, - F. Supp. -,(Ga., July 19,
1944); M. M. Argo, 3 T. C. No. 143; Stanley Bradshaw, Memo
T. C. opinion, July 31, 1944; Joseph Grant, Memo T. C. opinion,
Aug. 3, 1944.
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children were real partners making the same contributions
to business success that a stranger to the family might make.
In those cases which have rejected the family partnership, the
courts have found on the facts that no bona fide and actual
partnership existed, that the alleged partnership was one in
form only without real existence in fact, and that the wife
and children contributed nothing to the success of the busi-
ness and were not real partners at all.
FAMILY PARTNERSHIP CASES ARE "FACT" CASES
In short, family partnership cases fall clearly into the
category of "fact" cases; and in such cases the paramount
question is always essentially the same: "Ias the taxpayer
really done what lie professes he has done? Has he actually
taken the steps on which his attempt at avoidance is based?
If the steps have been taken as part of a real and not a
colorable or sham transaction, the avoidance succeeds; other-
wise it fails. 7 Viewed in this light, the apparently conflicting
authorities on this question becomes readily reconcilable, for
the conflict is not one involving differences of opinion as to
the applicable law so much as differences of interpretation
of the available facts.
In these husband and wife cases, it is obviously going
to be hard to get at the real facts. The solidarity of the
family unit is such that it is possible for the taxpayer to sur-
render legal title and technical dominion over the property
interest while retaining the substance of enjoyment and con-
trol in fact through understandings with his wife as to her
exercise of the rights allegedly transferred to her. As one
author puts it, "the facts as to such bed chamber arrange-
ments are difficult to prove or disprove."8
The Treasury Department, confronted with the practical
difficulty of proving that the husband and wife partnership
is not as real as it seems, has apparently adopted a policy
of holding all such arrangements suspect, and placing on the
taxpayer the burden of proving the reality and actuality of
the transaction. While this procedure may offend our legal
sensibilities in that it holds the taxpayer guilty until he
proves his innocence, it must be admitted to possess some
7. See Paul, "Studies in Federal Taxation" (1st ed. 1937) 130, for
a discussion of "fact" avoidance cases.
8. Id. at 151.
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merit when we consider that in more than half the cases here
reviewed, the family partnership WAS found to be unreal
and non-existent in fact.
In determining the relative strength or weakness of a
given partnership case situation it clearly becomes much
more important to know the facts that the courts have ac-
cepted as significant and indicative than it is to know the
relatively well-established law. An analysis of those facts is
the purpose of this survey.
EFFECT OF TAX AVOIDANCE MOTIVE
At the outset, it may be noted that *the mera desire to
avoid, or rather to reduce, income tax costs is not an indicia
of invalidity. The legal right of the taxpayer to reduce his
taxes or avoid them entirely by legal and proper procedures is
well established. The question is not what motivated the
transaction, but "whether the transaction under scrutiny is
in fact what it appears to be in form . . .,,
Nevertheless, the existence and presence of the tax motive
may well have an indirect effect in its influence on the think-
ing of the court and its interpretation of OTHER facts in
the case. In at least one case, where the inclusion of children
in the partnership was motivated by a desire to build personal
estates for the children, the lack of evidence as to any tax
motive in the transaction was noted by the court, and appar-
ently led to a more liberal and favorable view of certain other
facts which might otherwise have proved damaging.' 0 In other
cases, the fact that the transaction was motivated primarily
by the desire to avoid taxes, and served no other useful busi-
ness purpose whatever, has likewise been noted 3pecifically
by the court, and mentioned in both the findings of fact and
the opinion handed down by the majority of the court. In
none of these cases did the court rely on the tax m3tive alone
in rejecting the family partnership; but the presence of that
motive rather obviously influenced the majority of the court
9. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935). The above
quoted phrase appears in Chisholm v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 79 F. (2d) 14, 15 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1935), cert. den. 296
U. S. 641 (1935).
10. Justin Potter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A.
607 (1942). See J. D. Johnston, 3 T. C. -, No. 101, where
it was noted that there was no evidence of any tax motive.
19441
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in its views as to the relative significance of certain various
OTHER facts in the case.11
Motive, then, is not controlling, and is important only
in that a clearly evasive transaction may be viewed with
much more suspicion than one which is clearly motivated by
genuine family and business reasons. In the final analysis,
it is the fact of partnership, and not the reason for it, which
is the issue of supreme significance.
THE BASIC INDICIA OF PARTNERSHIP
What, then, are some of the indicia of actual partner-
ship? "In the typical contract of partnership the parties
expressly agree to unite their property and services as co-
proprietors to carry on a business for a profit, and to share
in the profits and losses in stated proportions." Such is the
general rule of law as stated in a leading text.12 Nor is the
tax rule much different. It may be emphasized that the
typical REAL partnership involves a unity or merger of
property or services or both. And it is noteworthy that in
every husband and wife partnership which has been upheld,
the wife has been found to have contributed either capital,
or services, or both.
Clearly, then, such a contribution to the partnership
either in capital or in personal services and-labor is a pri-
mary requisite to a bona fide family partnership that will
"hold water" tax-wise. If the facts reveal no such contri-
bution of either type the alleged partnership fails to be proved.
and becomes merely a device for the division of income.
This point is illustrated with great clarity by the well-
recognized line of cases holding that a husband engaged in
the professional and "personal service" type of enterprise
(where capital is unimportant and the only tangible contri-
bution his wife could make would be in the form of personal
service and labor) can not ordinarily create an effective fam-
ily partnership with his wife. In such cases, where the wife
performs no services whatever, and the husband continues
to operate the business, capital being unimportant, and busi-
ness earnings are largely if not entirely dependent on his
11. See Earp v. Jones, 131 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942); 0. W.
Lowry, 3 T. C. - , No. 97; Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. - , No. 98.
12. 40 Am. Jur. (Partnership) §32.
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personal activities, the alleged family partnership is consist-
ently rejected as unreal and non-existent.13
Of course, where capital is an important factor, and was
contributed by the wife from her own funds, a husband and
wife partnership MAY be upheld even in such enterprises.-
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE FORM OF SERVICES
What kind of services will sufficie to constitute a bona
fide contribution to the partnership?
Bookkeeping and clerical duties rendered by a mother,
who was in partnership with her son, when she devoted "con-
siderable time" to the work, were noted in one case. 15 In
this same case, the mother later retired as partner, and the
son took his wife into the firm in her place, and the partner-
ship was upheld, the wife contributing some capital from her
independent funds, and also doing "clerical work, typing, and
billing." In another case, wives who also contributed capital
from independent funds were properly included as partners,
especially since they also "acted as principals in the employ-
ment of the firm's staff."'8
13. See Schroder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 143 F. (2d)
346 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943), involving an engineering business;
Earp v. Jones, 131 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942), and EdwardJ. Miller, Memo T. C. opinion, March 18, 1944, both involving in-
surance agencies; Thomas M. McIntyre v. Commiisioner of In-
ternal Revneue, 37 B. T. A. 812 (1938), and !Tinkoff v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 120 F. (2d) 564 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941),
both involving public accountant firms; Fredeking v. Commission-
er of Internal Revenue, Memo T. C. opinion, Oct. 21, 1943, in-
volving a Standard Oil agency contract; Francis Doll, 2 T. C.
276, involving the sale of shoes on a commission basis; Waldbur-
ger v. Helvering, 131 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1 42), involving
the sale of textiles on a commission basis; Robert S. Eaton v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 37 B. T. A. 283 (1938), and
Harold G. Parker v. Commissioner of Internal Ravenue, 39 B.
T. A. 423 (1939), both involving the sale of securities; Harry
C. Fisher v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 29 B. T. A. 1041(1934), involving the syndicated "Mutt and Jeff" cartoon series,
where the attempt to include Bud Fisher's father -.nd mother as
partners failed, since they contributed neither capital nor labor;
M. M. Argo, 3 T. C. -, No. 143, involving a taxpayer engaged
in the repairing and rebuilding of electrical machinery.
14. See Clinton Davidson v. Commissioner of Interna7 Revenue, 43
B. T. A. 576 (1941), involving an insurance busines3; Humphreys
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 2nd,
1937 involving an accounting firm, the wives also contributing
services.
15. Arthur Stryker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 17 B. T. A.
1033 (1929).
16. Humphreys v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 F. (2d)
430 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1937).
19441
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Another husband and wife partnership was upheld where
the wife's capital contributions were nominal, but where it
was shown that "for several prior years (she) had completed
management of the office and performed various duties" in
her husband's beer business. It appeared that he was out
of the office on sales and delivery calls most of the time,
and she "waited on customers, looked after correspondence,
. . . checked trucks in and out, and took care of other
details," and so on, even hiring and firing employees and
holding "pep" meetings for the salesmen and drivers.17 Per-
haps, the classic case of service contributions by the wife is
that of Max German.18 Rose German, his wife, daily looked
after their fruit and vegetable store, while he ran the dela-
catessen while she continued to operate the old store. Still
later, she baked and boiled hams which the husband sold and
distributed.
So much for illustrative examples of real contributions
to the partnership on a service basis. In passing, it may be
noted that mere "wifely interest in the husband's business
as demonstration by taking telephone calls at home" is NOT
enough to constitute a service contribution.19
CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE FORM OF CAPITAL
What kind of capital contributions will suffice to
indicate the existence of a bona fide and real partnership
between husband and wife, either in the absence of service
contributions or supplementing them?
Obviously, where the wife makes an outright capital
investment in the business with her own independent funds,
her claim to bona fide status as a partner is very strong in-
deed. Where the funds she puts into the business were clearly
derived from sources other than her husband, and assuming
always that capital is important to business success, there
can be little question as to the reality of the partnership.20
17. Felix Zukaitis, 3 T. C. - , No. 102.
18. Max German, 2 T. C. 474.
19. Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. - , No. 98.
20. See, for instance, Humphreys v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 88 F. (2d) 430 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1937); Estate of Barringer,
Memo B. T. A. opinion, Sept. 16, 1942, where part of the wife's
interest was acquired by purchase; Arthur Stryker v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 17 B. T. A. 1033 (1929), where the
wife obtained the money from her father; Charles Tift v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 25 B. T. A. 986 (1932) where
[Vol. 20
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In one case., the wife purchased her interest from her hus-
band, giving him notes for the purchase money, these notes
to be paid out of her share of firm earnings, this purchase
being made by her after her husband had unsuccessfully at-
tempted to sell out his interest to his brothers and his father
(also partners) on somewhat similar terms.2 1
fore frequently, however, the wife is without capital of
her own, and her capital investment in the firm is derived
by way of gift from her husband. Sometimes capital in one
form or another is given to the wife, and then invested by
her in the business. Sometimes the husband merely assigns
a part interest in the business to her, and in so doing creates
the partnership. The result is the same, regardless of the
procedure followed. The wife (or child) becomez. a partner
in the business, on the basis of her alleged ownership of a
capital interest in the firm, which capital interest was ac-
quired by her by way of gift from her husband.
Nor is there anything inherently improper or invalid in
such a procedure. In fact, it has been frequently held that,
in a mercantile or manufacturing business (or ,3imilar en-
terprises where capital is a significant factor in business
success), "a husband and father . . . can make his wife
and minor children partners in the business by making bona
fide gifts to his wife and/or children of an interest in the
business assets and then entering into a partnership agree-
ment with the wife and/or children, they contributing as
their part of the capital . . . the interests which have been
given to them by the husband father."23
In passing, special note should perhaps be made of the
references in the above quotation to children as partners.
The inclusion of minor children in the partnership has been
frequently sustained, and the validity of the minor child's
status as a partner seems to be governed by the rame rules
the wives obtained their capital by gift and inheritance from
their own families.
21. J. D. Johnston, 3 T. C. - , No. 101.
22 Quoted from Robert P. Scherer, 3 T. C. - , No. 100. See Justin
Potter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A.- 607
(1942); Walter M. Moyer v. Commissioner of Interral Revenue,
35 B. T. A. 1155 (1937); Jasper Sipes v. Comnissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 31 B. T. A. 709 (1934); Estate of Barringer,
Memo B. T. A. opinion, Sept. 16, 1942; James 0. Peterson, Memo
T. C. opinion, Oct. 30, 1943; Hardymon v. Glenn, -, F. Supp.
(Ky., June 28, 1944); dicta in W. P. Sewell, Memo T. C.
opinion, Feb. 7, 1944.
1944]
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exactly as govern the status of the wife as a partner. The
attempt to include minor children as partners in a profes-
sional or personal service type of business has been unsuc-
cessful, just as the attempt to include the wife has failed
in such cases, where the child or wife contributes neither
capital nor services.2 3  But the Tax Court has recently and
clearly held that "a parent engaged in a business involving
a substantial capital investment may constitute his minor
children partners . . . by making them bona fide gifts
of an interest therein, either directly or by means of trusts."24
An even more successful procedure was that used in one case
where the husband included the wife as partner, and she
later assigned part of her interest to certain trusts for
their children, this re-assignment by her not only resulting
in recognizing the children as partners, but also being deemed
evidence of the unrestricted nature of the gift to her.
25
It is clear, therefore, that the wife can invest, in a
partnership with her husband, a capital interest donated to
her and received by gift from her husband. But it is equally
clear that, in such a case, there must be an absolute irro-
vocable, bona fide, and complete gift to the wife, with no
"understandings" as to her exercise of her rights, no indirect
control retained by the husband, no conditional gift solely for
the purpose of creating a fictional partnership.26 There should
23. See Tinkoff v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 120 F. (2d)
564 (C. C. A. 7th, 1941); Edward J. Miller, Memo T. C. opinion,
March 18, 1944, where son and daughter were included, and were
of age, but were rejected as partners the same as the wife.
24. Quoted from Irene McCullough, Memo T. C. opinion, July 19,
1944. See Robert P. Scherer, 3 T. C. , No. 100, where the
husband made capital gifts to the wife, individually, and to her
as trustee for their minor children; Richard H. Oakley v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 24 B. T. A. 1082 (1931), where
the husband likewise assigned partnership interests to the wife
individually, and to her as trustee for their minor children; Jus-
tin Potter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A. 607
(1942), where the husband and wife, already partners together,
joined in assigning certain interests in the firm to their minor chil-
dren, and the father managed the interests of the children as
guardian; Wachovia Bank (Stanback) v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, Memo T. C. opinion, June 22, 1944, where the
husband assigned part of his partnership interest to his brother
as trustee for his wife and children; Armstrong v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, F. (2d) - (C. C. A. - , July 6,
1944) ; Hardymon v. Glenn, - F. Supp. - (Ky., June 28,
1944).
25. Walter M. Moyer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 35 B. T. A.
1155 (1937).
26. A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T. C. -, No. 67.
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be such a gift that the court can say, as it did in one case,
that "no issue is raised that (the husband-father) did not
make valid, completed gifts to his wife individually, and to
his children in trust.''27
In short, to go back to the basic premise, there must
be a partnership in fact, not merely in form.
THE INDICIA OF INVALIDITY
All too often, the gifts to the wife, invested as capital
in the family partnership, have NOT been real and bona fide.
The courts have repeatedly been forced to find, on the facts
before them, that there was no intention of making the wife
a full and legal partner in the business, no intention of let-
ting her exercise her full and real rights as a partner, and
therefore no actual and legitimate partnership structure de-
spite the alleged gift of capital and the alleged creation of a
partnership enterprise.
What are some of these facts revealing the colorable na-
ture of the transaction, some of these indicia of invalidity
that have been seized upon by the courts in family partner-
ship cases and indicating that the claimed partnership was
non-existent in fact?
(a) Lack of Formal Agreements: While oral partnership
arrangements between members of the family have been
upheld,23 particularly where the oral arrangements included
others than the wife and children, it is quite clear that the
lack of any formal, written partnership contract and agree-
ment will prove to be rather strong evidence of tae fictitious
character of the claimed partnership. For instsnce, merely
indicating a transfer of certain interests to the wife and four
children, in entries on the books of the business, will not be
enough to show a real partnership relation, especially, when
coupled with other facts such as evidence that there was no
actual participation in the business by the alleged partners.29
Certainly, there should be a formal partnership agreement
27. Robert P. Scherer, 3 T. C. - , No. 100.
28. Arthur Stryker v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 17 B. T. A.
1033 (1929); Charles Tift v. Commissioner of Inteimal Revenue,
25 B. T. A. 986 (1932); Justin Potter v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 47 B. T. A. 607 (1942).
29. W. P. Sewell, Memo T. C. opinion, Feb. 7, 1944; Francis E. Tower,
3 T. C. -, No. 49, where the wife testified that her capital
interest "was just credited to me on the books."
1944]
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entered into between the parties the same as would be pre-
pared if the partnership were with strangers. The import-
ance of this point is illustrated by one case where a partner-
ship was rejected because of lack of any tangible agreement,
and was later upheld for later tax years after the execution
of a formal partnership contract between husband and wife.10
Similarly, in another case, the partnership was upheld only
from the date of the formal written contract, notwithstand-
ing that the wife admittedly rendered real and substantial
services for many years prior to that writing.3' Again, a
family partnership was said by the Tax Court in another
case to be "evidenced by proof of the strongest character,
i.e., by a written instrument signed by (the husband) and
his wife, duly acknowledged by both, and delivered to the
wife."32
(b) Failure to Record Partnership: The failure to reg-
ister or record the partnership as required under many state
laws may also prove damaging as evidence of lack of reality
and legality in the arrangement.3  It may be noted in this
connection that under Indiana statutes, if the business is
operated under a name that does not reveal the true sur-
names of all partners, a certificate must be filed with the
clerk of the circuit court of the county where the business
has its offices.34 Failure to so register the firm name and
the members of the partnership would undoubtedly be an
indication that the partnership had not been formally and
legally recognized, where the business continued under its
former name. The fact that the formal partnership agree-
ment HAD been recorded as required under state law was
noted in several cases upholding family partnerships, as at
least evidence of reality."
(c) Limited Partnership: The fact that the wife was
30. Elizabeth M. Coombs v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 25
B. T. A. 1320 (1932).
31. Felix Zukaitis, 3 T. C. - , No. 102.
32. M. W. Smith, 3 T. C. - , No. 110.
33. Ed Kasch and Theodora Kasch v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 25 B. T. A. 284, 287 (1932); Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. -,
No. 98.
34. Ind. Acts 1909, c. 151, § 1, Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) § 50-201.
35. Sidney Nathan, Memo T. C. Opinion, May 14, 1943; Justin Pot-
ter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A. 607 (1942),
where the failure to record the partnership was noted, but was
deemed of no significance since such action was not required
under the laws of the state involved.
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merely a limited partner, without management power or re-
sponsibility, has proved damaging in several ca 3es, as indi-
cative of a lack of full partnership status.-6 In one case, the
wife's participation as a limited partner was approved, and
the partnership upheld notwithstanding that fact; but it
may be noted that the surrounding facts were e:tremely fa-
vorable, the court expressly stating that "the evidence that
the rights to which the wives were entitled we.re exercised
by them free of control of the (husbands) is uncontradicted.
They have the full legal right to sell . . . the whole part
of their interests to such persons and at such times as they
wish."3  In the face of clear and undisputed evidence of
the bona fide nature of the transaction, the fact of limited
partnership becomes unimportant in and of itself,38 but it
is nevertheless a dangerous fact.
It is clear that management of the business CAN be
delegated to the husband as general partner;: but such dele-
gation, limiting the wife's participation, will, it is equally
clear, be viewed with some suspicion as tending to make her
participation unreal; and when coupled with other indicia of
invalidity, may result in an adverse decision.
(d) Lack of Voice in Management: Where the wife, as
part of the formal partnership agreement or by tacit under-
standing with the husband, agrees to exercise no voice in the
management of the business, the partnership is quite likely
to be rejected as unreal, since that is one of the common at-
tributes of a real partnership relationship.40 For instance,
in rejecting a wife as partner in her husband's insurance
36. R. W. Camfield, Memo T. C. opinion, Feb. 9, 1944; Francis E.
Tower, 3 T. C. - , No. 49; 0. W. Lowry, 3 T. C. - , No. 97;
W. P. Sewell, Memo T. C. opinion, Feb. 7, 1944.
37. Sidney Nathan, Memo T. C. opinion, May 14, 1943.
38. Limited partnership ignored in Wachovia Bank (Stanback) v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Memo T. C. opinion, June 22,
1944.
39. Clinton Davidson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 43 B. T. A.
576 (1941); Charles Tift v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 25
B. T. A. 986 (1932); N. H. Hazewood v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 29 B. T. A. 595 (1933); Walter M. Moyer v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 35 B. T. A. 1155 (19 7V;
Robert P. Scherer, 3 T. C. -, No. 101; Wachovia Bank (Stan-
back) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Memo T. C. opinion,
June 22, 1944.
40. R. W. Camfielf, Memo T. C. opinion, Feb. 9, 1944; Francis E.
Towser, 3 T. C. - , No. 49; 0. W. Lowry, 3 T. C. - , No. 97;
Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. -, No. 98; Mead v. Comrmissioner of
Internal Revenue, 131 F. (2d) 323 (C. C. A. 5th, 1942).
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business, the court noted that "it was not intended that she
have any voice in the business," as evidenced by the husband's
testimony that she had no insurance license and "we didn't
intend for her to have one. '4 1
(e) Restrictions on Wife's Rights as Partner: The im-
position of restrictions on the wife's right to exercise her
normal legal rights as a partner (such as provisions under
which she can not assign her interest without the consent
of the husband, provisions limiting her power to bind the
partnership, provisions restricting her right to withdraw from
the firm, or restricting her right to withdraw her share of
the profits) tends to show that the wife was never intended
to possess a real and full bona fide partnership interest.42
The existence of such restrictions is generally dangerous if
not fatal to the claim of partnership.4 3
The wife certainly should have all of the power and
authority normally inherent in the partnership relationship,
if the reality of the partnership is to be free from question . 4
(f) Reversion to Husband at Termination of Firm: A pro-
vision under which all firm property vests in the husband
on termination of the partnership during his lifetime is
bound to raise strong suspicions as to the reality of the part-
41. Earp v. Jones 131 F. (2d) 292 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942).
42. 0. W. Lowry, 3 T. C. - , No 97; Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T. C. 7,
No. 98, where husband had unlimited drawing account, and wife
had no drawing account; R. W. Camfield, Memo T. C. opinion,
Feb. 9, 1944. But cf. Walter M. Moyer v. Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, 35 B. T. A. 1155 (1937).
43. Note also those cases where the ABSENCE of such restrictions
has been favorably noticed by the court, as in Clinton Davidson
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 42 B. T. A. 576 (1941),
where the court observed that the wife could withdraw from
the firm on written notice, in which event the capital interest
was to be divided half and half. See also Justin Potter v. Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A. 607 (1942), where
the court observed that the "donor did not make gifts with
strings attached. No powers were reserved as conditions of
the gift"; Sidney Nathan, Memo T. C. opinion, May 14, 1943,
where the wife's unlimited and unrestricted right to withdraw
and sell her interest even overbalanced the adverse fact of limited
partnership, as noted earlier.
44. Francis Doll, 2 T. C. 276; Elizabeth M. Coombs v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 25 B. T. A. 1320 (1932); Justin Potter v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 47 B. T. A. 607 (1942),
involving children as partners, where the court did not overlook
the fact that the father managed and operated the business as
guardian, and failed to open separate accounts for the children,
and observed that more careful procedure "would have eliminated
some of the (government's) questioning of the status of the
matter in general."
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nership.43 Certainly, it can hardly be said that the gift to
the wife of a capital interest in the firm was irrevocable,
complete and indefeasible in the face of such & clause in
the partnership contract.
(g) Capital Gift Conditioned on Use in Firm. Similarly,
where the gift of a capital interest to the wife is not free
and unconditional, but is conditioned on the investment of
the capital in the business, questions may be raised; and
such a conditional gift, is a clear ear-mark of unreality in the
transaction.'- In one case, a husband gave his wfe $50,000
outright, paying gift tax thereon. She then used this money,
plus an additional $55,000 of her personal notes, plus a small
amount of her own cash, to buy a half interest in the hus-
ditioned on the use of the funds in forming the partnership,
agreement, it was held that the partnership was unreal and
non-existent, because the husband's gift of $50,00) was con-
ditioned on the use of the funds in forming the partnership,
and because there was no real liability intended on the wife's
notes, with the result that the alleged purchase was fictional.Y4
Similarly, where there was no "unconditional gift" of the
capital interest, since the wife "could only use it in one way,
namely, to place . . . the assets . . into the partner-
ship," the transfer of the capital interest was held "more
fanciful than actual since there was no purpose to the (trans-
action) apart from the agreed plan that the gift would de-
termine her interest in the partnership.'4 8
Contrarily, where the taxpayer was advised by his ac-
countant that following gifts of corporation stock to his wife
and children, they would not be obliged to go along with him
in dissolving the corporation and forming a partnership, and
he required that the gifts be absolute with no strings at-
tached, the partnership formed later after dissolving the
corporation was held valid in fact.'9
THE INDICIA OF VALIDITY
If facts such as we have reviewed indicate lack of real-
ity in the partnership arrangement, what facts tend to es-
45. R. W. Camfield, Memo T. C. opinion, Feb. 9, 1944.
46. 0. W. Lowry, 3 T. C. - , No. 97.
47. A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T. C. - , No. 67.
48. Francis E. Tower, 3 T. C. - , No. 49.
49. Hardymon v. Glenn, - F. Supp. - (Ky., June 28, 1944).
19441
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
tablish a real and bona fide arrangement, to show a vesting
of full and complete ownership in the wife-donee of a capital
interest in the firm, a clear and complete vesting of the
rights of genuine partnership? Some of the indicia of va-
lidity may be derived from the facts in the reported cases,
both these which involved capital interests donated to the
wife, and other family partnership cases.
(a) Revelation of Relationship to Public: Evidence that
the partnership relationship was clearly revealed to the public
at large, and was generally recognized by the public will
prove helpful,-° as where the wife's interest was made known
to the bank in financial statements and in connection with
firm borrowings.1 Contrarily, for example, where the hus-
band orally announced the partnership to his accountant and
certain business associates, but filed financial statements
with the bank showing himself as sole owner of the business,
the failure to reveal the partnership at the bank was pointed
out by the Court as evidencing a lack of reality in the part-
nership52 Evidence that the partnership was openly pro-
claimed to the public, as where suits were brought in the
name of the husband and his wife as "partners, trading as
the J. Howard Coombs Lumber Company," indicated a bona
fide arrangement.53
(b) Withdrawal of Funds: he withdrawal of funds by
the wife, and the use of these funds to pay the personal debts
of the wife, has been noted in some cases.54 Similarly, where
the wife had the right, as partner, to draw checks on the
partnership account, and frequently exercised this right,
these facts were noted as evidencing a real partnership struc-
ture.5 As a proper corollary, where the taxpayer's 79-year-
old father was made a partner, and made only nominal with-
drawals against some $110,000 of profit credits, and was
given the right to draw checks on the partnership only after
revenue agents started their investigation, the partnership
was held unreal.56
50. Estate of Barringer, Memo B. T. A. opinion, Sept. 16, 1942.
51. James 0. Peterson, Memo T. C. opinion, Oct. 30, 1943.
52. W. P. Sewell, Memo T. C. opinion, Feb. 7, 1944.
53. Elizabeth M. Coombs v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 25
B. T. A. 1320 (1932).
54. R. C. Bennett, Memo B. T. A. opinion, - ; M. W. Smith, 3
T. C.- , No. 110.
55. J. D. Johnston, 3 T. C. - , No. 101.
56. Blalock v. Allen, - F. Supp. - (Ga., July 19, 1944).
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(c) Transfer of Interest by Wife: Where the wife exer-
cises her unrestricted proprietary rights in her partnership
interest, as where she received a $100,000 interest in the
husband's business by gift from the husband, and later cre-
ated trusts for her children, out of her own interest in the
firm, there is evidence of a bona fide transaction. Such a
re-transferring of her acquired interest in the firm was con-
sidered in one case as strong evidence of full owaership on
her part.57
(d) Participation in Management: Actual participation
by the wife in the management affairs of the firm is also
indicative of real partnership stature on her part."8 Consul-
tation with the wife with regard to the expansion of the
business, matters of personnel, and other questions of im-
portance, she having an intimate knowledge of the business,
is evidence of her participation as a full partner.3 9
(e) Consent of Other Parties: The fact that other per-
sons are concerned in the business and have consented to the
wife's participation as a partner and recognized her as such
is also evidence of real partnership status. In several cases,
the fact that other partners consented to the wife's entrance
into the firm was noted by the court.60 For instance, in one
case the United States Circuit Court of Appeals made much
of the fact that "all (partners) consented to the trust (for
the taxpayer's children) becoming a member of the partner-
ship," and that "all of the members of the partnership knew
that the trust was a partner."61  Similarly, where a husband
and wife partnership in a Coca Cola franchise was subject
to approval by the parent distributing company, and such
approval was asked and obtained, there was evidence of a
real partnership.62
57. Walter M. Moyer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 35 B. T. A.
1155 (1937).
58. Ibid.
59. Arthur Stryker. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, a7 B. T. A.
1033 (1929).
60. Jasper Sipes v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 31 B. T. A.
709 (1934); Justin Potter v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
47 B. T. A. 607 (1942); J. D. Johnston, 3 T. C. -, No. 101;
Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U. S. 136 (1932), where v. wife -was
NOT recognized as a partner because the other partners in the
firm had NOT approved or consented to her membership.
61. Armstrong v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, - F. (2d)
- (C. C. A. -, July 6, 1944).
62. N. H. Hazlewood v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 29 B. T. A.
595 (1933).
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(f) Evidence of Accounting to Wife: While in most
family partnership cases, adequate accounts have been kept
of the shares of the partners, it is helpful also to keep the




Such are the guideposts to the reality or non-existence
of the family partnership. There are other points, not re-
vealed or noted in any of the cases reviewed in this discus-
sion, which might well prove important in showing the va-
lidity of a family partnership. For instance, an estate sur-
vey, re-examining the wife's estate situation in the light of
the partnership interest acquired by her, accompanied by tax
computations assuming her full ownership of this interest
and its taxability in her estate, might well indicate her as-
sumption of full ownership, particularly when followed by
positive acts such as a revision of her will to include pro-
visions directing the executor in his handling of her partner-
ship interest.
The development by the husband and wife of purchase
and sale agreements with respect to their partnership inter-
ests in case of death, supported with life insurance to im-
prove the liquid position of their respective estates, might
also indicate that the parties conceived themselves to be gen-
uine partners. Other points may come to the mind of the
attorney or accountant in connection with his particular case.
It is not pretended that this survey is all-inclusive in its
review of pertinent facts.
Moreover, it is obvious that no SINGLE fact is necessar-
ily controlling and decisive in any given case. It is the ac-
cumulation of evidence either for or against the reality of
the partnership that proves or disproves the fact of partner-
ship. In the final analysis, the problem is one of weighing
the evidence and reaching a decision as to the facts in the
given case. There exists in every family partnership case
what one court described as "a somewhat difficult problem
63. See Charles Tift v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 25 B. T. A.
986 (1932), where regular monthly statements were made to the
wives and noted as evidence of their participation in the man-
agement; Thomas M. McIntyre v. Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue, 37 B. T. A. 812 (1938), where the lack of accounting to
the wife was noted as evidence of no real partnership status on
her part.
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in the weighing of the evidence.""6  And as long as family
partnership cases remain "fact" cases, as they inevitably
must, and as long as judges are human and differ in their
interpretation of given facts, there will be difficulties in
these cases because there always "is room for differences of
opinion upon the real situation which the facts present." 6"
Few family partnership cases indeed will be letter per-
fect. In most of them, there will be some indicia of invalidity
and some indicia of validity present in the facts. The ques-
tion, then, is simply-"How many and how strong are the
facts pointing one way or the other?" The measuring rods
are not precise. There is always the human element, differ-
ent minds viewing the same facts and reaching different con-
clusions, particularly where the case is close and there is no
preponderance of indicia one way or the other. But they
are the only measuring rods that are available; and used
judiciously they can indicate rather accurately the relative
strength or weakness of almost any particular case.
REASONABLE CORPORATE SALARIES
BRUCE H. JOHNSON*
Corporations, under Section 23(a) (1) of Internal Rev-
enue Code, are afforded deductions in computing net income
of all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred in
carrying on any trade or business, including "a reasonable
allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal
services actually rendered." The decisions which have in-
terpreted this Section, present in every Revenue Act since
1918, indicate that there are three tests for determining
reasonable salary deduction: (1) Is the paymz:nt in fact
salary or other compensation; (2) Have personal services
been actually rendered; and (3) Is the payment reasonable
when measured by the amount and quality of the services
performed with relation to the business of the particular
taxpayer?'
64. Dissenting opinion in Felix Zukaitis, 3 T. C. - , No. 102.
65. Dissenting opinion in J. D. Johnston, 3 T. C. - , No. 101.
* Of the Indianapolis Bar.
1. See Lenox Clothes Shops, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 189 F. (2d) 56 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943). See also Mertens,
"Law of Federal Income Taxation" 1 25.44.
